Training Is in Place, Procedures Exist — So Why Isn’t Safety Performance Improving?

In most organizations, demonstrating that an occupational safety or process safety management system exists is not particularly difficult.

Training records are available. Procedures have been developed. Toolbox talks are conducted. Risk assessments are completed. HAZOP studies have been performed. Near-miss reporting systems are in place. Audits are carried out and performance indicators are monitored.

All of these activities matter.

But the more important question is:

Have they actually changed the way the organization works and makes decisions every day?

Because having a safety system on paper is not the same as consistently applying that system in practice.

Recent research provides an interesting perspective on the relationship between safety climate, safety culture, leadership and safety performance.

Why does safety climate matter?

A 2026 study by Lino, Budiyanto and Agustedi in the palm oil processing sector reported a positive and significant relationship between safety climate and safety performance.

Management commitment to safety emerged as an important element of safety climate.

This distinction matters.

Employees do not determine an organization's real safety priorities only by reading policies or attending training sessions.

They also observe what management does when production pressure increases, when an abnormal situation develops, when somebody stops a job, or when bad news reaches management.

The same study also reported that safety leadership did not always produce the expected strengthening effect. The authors discuss production pressure, insufficient role modelling and communication problems as possible explanations.

This should not be interpreted as evidence that leadership harms safety.

A more useful question is:

How consistent are management's statements about safety with its actual behaviour during operations?

Why are training and communication not always enough?

Another 2026 study by Oktaviani, Ilmi and Adhimursandi examined safety training, safety communication, safety culture and safety performance.

Their findings suggest that safety training and safety communication contribute to the development of safety culture, while safety culture is strongly associated with safety performance.

However, the direct effects of training and communication on safety performance were not demonstrated in the same way. The authors found that much of the relationship operated through safety culture.

This does not mean that:

"Safety training does not work."

It suggests something more important:

Delivering training and converting that training into organizational behaviour are not the same thing.

An employee may know the correct answer during a training session.

They may understand the procedure.

They may recognize the hazard.

But if production pressure, schedule pressure or management behaviour sends a different message during actual operations, what is taught and what is practiced can quickly become disconnected.

This is where safety culture becomes critical.

Safety as documented is not the same as safety as practiced

From a process safety perspective, the distinction can be expressed very simply:

Safety as documented ≠ Safety as practiced

An organization may appear to have a very strong safety management system.

HAZOP studies have been completed.

A Management of Change procedure exists.

A Permit to Work system is in place.

Standard Operating Procedures are current.

Training has been completed.

A near-miss reporting system operates.

Audit actions are being tracked.

All of these are necessary.

But understanding the real safety performance of an organization requires asking different questions.

Can an operator genuinely stop the job when production is under pressure?

When someone reports a hazardous condition, are they supported or treated as the person delaying production?

Are critical HAZOP recommendations actually implemented, or simply marked as "closed" in an action tracker?

Does a temporary bypass gradually become the normal way of operating?

Is a change genuinely evaluated through Management of Change, or is the documentation completed after the decision has effectively been made?

Are near-miss reports used as learning opportunities, or mainly collected to generate statistics?

The answers to these questions often tell us much more about the organization's actual safety culture.

Safety activity is not the same as safety capability

Another useful distinction is between safety activity and safety capability.

An organization may deliver hundreds of training sessions, conduct numerous field inspections, complete dozens of HAZOP studies and hold regular toolbox talks.

All of these activities have value.

But they mainly tell us how much safety activity has taken place.

The more important question is:

Have these activities improved the organization's ability to recognize hazards, manage deviations, stop unsafe work, escalate bad news and learn from failure?

If not, the organization may have generated a large volume of safety activity without developing an equally strong safety capability.

Perhaps we should ask different questions

"How many hours of safety training did we deliver?" is a useful metric.

But it should be accompanied by another question:

"What changed in the field after the training?"

Instead of asking only:

"Was the HAZOP completed?"

we should also ask:

"Which critical risk was actually reduced as a result of the HAZOP?"

Instead of asking:

"Do we have a near-miss reporting system?"

ask:

"Can people report bad news without fear?"

And perhaps the most revealing question is:

When safety conflicts with production, schedule or cost, what does the organization actually prioritize?

When does safety culture become visible?

Safety culture cannot be fully understood by reading procedures.

It becomes visible when production pressure increases, when equipment fails, when an unexpected process deviation occurs, when an employee stops the job or when bad news reaches senior management.

Employees learn the organization's real priorities not only from what they are told, but from how the organization reacts at the moment of decision.

A simple way to describe safety culture may therefore be:

How an organization behaves when priorities are in conflict.

Conclusion

Training is necessary.

Procedures are necessary.

Audits are necessary.

Communication is necessary.

Leadership is necessary.

But none of them become effective simply because they exist.

When recent studies are considered alongside the broader safety literature, a consistent message emerges:

Training creates knowledge. Communication builds awareness. Leadership makes priorities visible. Safety culture determines whether these elements become embedded in everyday behaviour and decision-making.

So, when assessing an organization's safety culture, it may be more useful to look beyond the number of training sessions, inspections or completed studies.

The more revealing question may be:

When safety conflicts with production, time or cost, what decision does the organization actually make?

From a process safety perspective, that is often where the real test begins.

References

Lino, R., Budiyanto & Agustedi. (2026). The Impact of Safety Climate and Safety Participation on Employee Safety Performance with Transformational Leadership as a Moderator in the Palm Oil Sector. International Journal of Management Analytics, 4(3), 443–452. DOI: 10.59890/ijma.v4i3.32.

Oktaviani, D. F., Ilmi, Z. & Adhimursandi, D. (2026). The Influence of Safety Training and Safety Communication on Safety Performance: The Mediating Role of Safety Culture. International Journal of Scientific Multidisciplinary Research, 4(7), 1143–1162. DOI: 10.55927/ijsmr.v4i7.97.

Zohar, D. (1980). Safety Climate in Industrial Organizations: Theoretical and Applied Implications. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65(1), 96–102.

Griffin, M. A. & Neal, A. (2000). Perceptions of Safety at Work: A Framework for Linking Safety Climate to Safety Performance, Knowledge, and Motivation. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 5(3), 347–358.

Christian, M. S., Bradley, J. C., Wallace, J. C. & Burke, M. J. (2009). Workplace Safety: A Meta-analysis of the Roles of Person and Situation Factors. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94(5), 1103–1127.

Clarke, S. (2013). Safety Leadership: A Meta-analytic Review of Transformational and Transactional Leadership Styles as Antecedents of Safety Behaviours. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 86(1), 22–49.

Naji, G. M. A., Isha, A. S. N., Alazzani, A., Saleem, M. S. & Alzoraiki, M. (2022). Assessing the Mediating Role of Safety Communication Between Safety Culture and Employees Safety Performance. Frontiers in Public Health, 10, 840281.